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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Although Rand Allen Melius was sleeping in the driver's seat of his idling truck when
police encountered him, he was arrested and eventually charged with physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. During voir dire at Mr. Melius' trial, the prosecutor
asked two prospective jurors to take a particular view of evidence to be adduced at trial. After
those two prospective jurors answered the prosecutor's questions, the district court excused them
for cause upon the State's motions, over Mr. Melius' objections.
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Melius, and the district court imposed a unified
sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. Mr. Melius had been on probation in three other
cases involving operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, and the district court
revoked probation and executed the sentences in those cases. Mr. Melius filed an Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in all four cases, which the district court denied.
In this consolidated appeal, Mr. Melius asserts the district court abused its discretion in
his most recent case when it allowed the State during voir dire to require prospective jurors to
take a particular view of evidence to be adduced at trial, and, in the alternative, when it imposed
his sentence. He also asserts the district court abused its discretion in all four cases when it
denied his Rule 35 motions.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Around 12:20 AM on April 19, 2018, Officer Christopher Schatz of the Coeur d'Alene
Police Department saw a pickup truck in a bar parking lot idling for a period of time. (See
Tr. 11/07/18, pp.130, L.15 - p.137, L.17.) When he walked up to the driver's side of the pickup,
he noticed the pickup was running and a male was sleeping inside, slumped over in the driver's
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seat behind the wheel. (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.137, L.10 - p.138, L.4.) Nobody else was in the
pickup. (Tr. 11/07/18, p.138, Ls.5-6.) The officer woke up the male, who identified himself as
Mr. Melius. (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.138, Ls.7-24.) Officer Schatz noticed the odor ofan alcoholic
beverage coming from the pickup, and Mr. Melius had slurred speech and bloodshot, glassy
eyes. (Tr. 11/07/18, p.139, Ls.16-21.) Mr. Melius initially indicated that he was sleeping it off,
but when the officer asked how much he had to drink, he denied consuming any alcohol. (See
Tr. 11/07/18, p.139, L.25-p.140, L.9.)
Mr. Melius failed the field sobriety tests Officer Schatz had him perform.

(See

Tr. 11/07/18, p.143, L.22 - p.149, L.15.) Officer Schatz then determined Mr. Melius was under
the influence of an impairing substance and arrested him for DUI. (Tr. 11/07/18, p.149, Ls.1622.) The officer searched the pickup, fmding an empty beer can and a blender bottle containing
an amber liquid that smelled like beer.

(See Tr. 11/07/18, p.170, Ls.3-16.)

Mr. Melius

ultimately consented to having his blood drawn, which took place at the Coeur d'Alene Police
Department. (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.152, L.25 - p.153, L.8.) The blood draw gave a BAC result of
0.245. (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.201, Ls.3-16; State's Ex. 3.)
In Kootenai County No. CR28-18-6043 (hereinafter, the 2018 case), the State charged
Mr. Melius with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or
intoxicating substance, felony, LC. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005(9), with a persistent violator
sentencing enhancement under LC. § 19-2514. (No. 46851 R., pp.59-61.) Mr. Melius entered a
not guilty plea. (No. 46851 R., p.67.) The State later filed a Motion to Amend Information.
(No. 46851 R., pp.69-70.) Mr. Melius did not object to the motion, and the district court granted
it. (Tr. 09/12/18, p.5, Ls.14-21.) The Amended Information charged Mr. Melius with physical
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control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, LC.§§ 18-8004, 18-8005(9), and
19-2514. (No. 46851 R., pp.111-13.)
At the time of Mr. Melius' arrest, he was on probation in three other cases involving
alleged violations ofl.C. § 18-8004. (See No. 46820 R., pp.194-95; No. 46821 R., pp.116-17;
No. 46850 R., pp.92-96.) In those cases, officers had found him asleep or confused in a parked,
running vehicle, and arrested him after he failed or refused to perform field sobriety tests. (See
No. 46820 PSI, p.10; No. 46821 R., pp.18-19; No. 46850 PSI, p.6; No. 46850 R., p.30.) 1
In Kootenai County No. CR-2014-22651 (hereinafter, the 2014 case), a jury found
Mr. Melius guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
and/or intoxicating substance, as well as misdemeanor possession of an open container of alcohol
in a motor vehicle, and Mr. Melius pleaded guilty to misdemeanor driving without a valid
driver's license and having two prior DUI convictions in the last ten years. (See No. 46820
R., pp.80-82, 102-03, 135-36.) In Kootenai County No. CR-2016-12717 (hereinafter, the 2016
case), Mr. Melius pleaded guilty to felony operating a motor vehicle and misdemeanor driving
without privileges. (See No. 46821 R., pp.47-49, 52.) In Kootenai County No. CR-2017-10168
(hereinafter, the 2017 case), Mr. Melius pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol and/or intoxicating substance. 2 (See No. 46850 R., pp.72-74, 80.)

1

All citations to "PSI" refer to the respective Confidential Exhibits filed in Mr. Melius'
four cases.
2
In the 2014 case, Mr. Melius admitted to violating his probation by committing the new crimes
in, respectively, the 2016 case and the 2017 case. (See No. 46820 R., pp.155-56, 161-62, 18485, 188.) In the 2016 case, Mr. Melius admitted to violating his probation by committing the
new crime in the 2017 case. (See No. 46821 R., pp.79-81, 112.)
In the 2014 case, Mr. Melius was on supervised probation for a period of three years,
with an underlying unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (See No. 46820
R., pp.142-46, 164-65, 194-95.) In the 2016 case, Mr. Melius was on supervised probation for a
period of three years, with an underlying unified sentence of eight years, with four years fixed.
(See No. 46821 R., pp.54-56, 61-62, 116-17.) In the 2017 case, Mr. Melius was on supervised
3

In the 2014, 2016, and 2017 cases, the State filed a Motion for Probation Violation
alleging that Mr. Melius had violated his probation. (See No. 46820 R., pp.196-97; No. 46821
R., pp.118-19; No. 46850 R., pp.101-02.)
Mr. Melius exercised his right to a jury trial in the 2018 case. (See No. 46851 R., pp.17596.) During voir dire, when the district court read the Amended Information to the prospective
jurors, it included that the alleged offense of physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol took place "on or about the 19th day of April, 2018." (See Tr. 11/07/18,
p.15, Ls.11-12.) Later, the prosecutor, Arthur Verharen, told the prospective jurors that the
alleged offense "here is that [Mr. Melius] was behind the driver's wheel, in the driver's seat,
with the engine running. There's no allegation of driving." (Tr. 11/07/18, p.60, Ls.18-22.) He
asked: "Does anybody have a problem that you can be charged under the DUI law with actual
physical control if you're behind the driver's seat with the engine running, but the car is not
moving? Does anybody think that is too ticky-tacky?" (Tr. 11/07/18, p.60, L.23 -p.61, L.2.)
After the district court overruled Mr. Melius' objection on the basis that the prosecutor's
line of questioning went to the facts of the case, a prospective juror stated that he thought:
"Somebody obviously knows if they had too much to drink. They go out to their car and they
think, I'm going to sleep it off, but it's 10 below, I'm going to fire this up and keep it warm, and
there's certain circumstances that should make people-that that law is a little bit too harsh, let's
say." (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.61, L.3 - p.63, L.4.) After this first prospective juror indicated he did
not know if he could set aside his misgivings about the law, the prosecutor moved to excuse the
prospective juror for cause. (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.64, Ls.5-22.) Upon questioning by defense

probation for a period of five years, with an underlying unified sentence of ten years, with five
years fixed. (See No. 46851 R., pp.92-96.)
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counsel, the first prospective juror indicated he could follow an instruction from the judge
despite his personal opinion, and could find a person guilty of possessing marijuana even if he
disagreed that marijuana should be illegal. (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.64, L.25 -p.65, L.10.)
Defense counsel then objected to excusing the first prospective juror, because, "It sounds
like this juror can follow the law and the instructions, despite the prosecutor's attempt to get him
to rule on the merits of the case." (Tr. 11/07/18, p.65, Ls.11-15.) The prosecutor then asked the
prospective juror: "So what about the situation here that we were talking about? Can you set
aside your personal conviction about physical control and being under the influence?"
(Tr. 11/07/18, p.65, L.25 -p.66, L.3.) Defense counsel objected, on the basis the prosecutor was
"asking the juror to essentially give his verdict right now, to rule on the case. He's told him what
he thinks the facts will show, he's told him what he expects Your Honor will instruct the jury on,
and now he's saying, what will you do with that information, will you follow the law, will you
convict him." (Tr. 11/07/18, p.66, Ls.4-10.) The district court overruled that objection: "I
disagree that that's what has happened here. We have allegations only, so far, and we're asking
about opinions on a certain kind oflaw." (Tr. 11/07/18, p.66, Ls.11-14.)
The first prospective juror stated he would have a hard time going along with that law,
and he did not know if he could follow the judge's instructions on that law. (See Tr. 11/07/18,
p.66, L.15 - p.67, L.18.) The district court then excused the first prospective juror for cause.
(See Tr. 11/07/18, p.67, L.19- p.68, L.9.)

The prosecutor subsequently asked another prospective juror what he thought, and this
second prospective juror discussed the facts of the case: "I struggle with the fact that the car was
not moving, was not technically operating a motor vehicle. In my eyes, like he said, it's April, it
could be cold. You can't technically walk down the street and talk to anybody a lot of times
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without getting in trouble, so where do you draw the line of the better of the two evils?"
(Tr. 11/07/18, p.69, Ls.16-25.) When the prosecutor asked if he could put aside his personal
convictions, the second prospective juror replied, "I would say, without hearing all the details,
I'm not sure if I could set that aside and make that decision just setting here right now to say I
can totally get past that." (Tr. 11/07/18, p.70, Ls.1-11; see Tr. 11/07/18, p.70, Ls.19-22.)
The second prospective juror indicated he could see a situation where, after the evidence
was presented, he possibly would not follow the law because of a personal conviction. (See
Tr. 11/07/18, p.70, L.23 - p.71, L.1.)

When the prosecutor moved to excuse the second

prospective juror for cause, defense counsel asked him, "why do you say you need to know more
facts? Why do you say that?" (Tr. 11/07/18, p.71, Ls.2-7.) He replied: "I'm sure there's a lot
more to this .... I'm sure there's a lot more details that are going to come out that could change
my opinion on that, but as I sit here with my limited knowledge, to me, it doesn't seem right."
(Tr. 11/07/18, p.71, Ls.8-16.) Defense counsel asked him, "So when you're responding to the
prosecutor's question, correct me if I'm wrong, you're actually trying to answer his questions in
terms of whether you would convict or not convict, aren't you?" (Tr. 11/07/18, p.71, Ls.17-21.)
The second prospective juror answered: "With the limited knowledge I have, yes. I mean, he's
basically telling me I have to make a yes or no answer on whether I can set that aside at this
point in time." (Tr. 11/07/18, p.71, Ls.22-25.)
The second prospective juror also indicated that he was struggling with that, to him, "the
engine running and the tires not moving is not operating a motor vehicle under the influence."
(See Tr. 11/07/18, p.72, Ls.1-14.) He did not know ifhe could follow an instruction that would

leave no room for interpretation. (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.72, Ls.15-20.) Defense counsel then
objected to the State's motion to excuse the second prospective juror: "Again, I believe the
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prosecutor's line of questioning is really asking this witness to say, how would you vote on this
case, and when the witness says, I don't know it depends on how the facts come out, all he's
saying is he doesn't know how he would decide the case." (Tr. 11/07/18, p.72, L.24-p.73, L.4.)
The district court seemingly disagreed with that characterization, stating, "And for the third time,
I disagree with how the prosecutor is asking the question." (See Tr. 11/07/18, p. 73, Ls.5-7.)
The district court granted the motion to excuse the second prospective juror for cause,
because "[h]e did indicate that he did not believe that he could set aside his feelings on this under
the circumstances."

(Tr. 11/07/18, p.73, Ls.8-11.)

At the conclusion of his examination,

Mr. Melius' counsel did not pass the panel for cause. (Tr. 11/07/18, p.104, L.22 - p.105, L.1.)
Mr. Melius elected to not testify in his own defense. (See Tr. 11/08/18, p.226, L.25 p.229, L.6.) The jury found Mr. Melius guilty of physical control of a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. (Tr. 11/08/18, p.270, Ls.4-16.) Mr. Melius pleaded guilty to having
two prior violations of I.C. § 18-8004 within the past fifteen years, and to having at least two
prior felonies. (Tr. 11/08/18, p.273, L.22 - p.275, L.3.)
At the combined probation violation disposition and sentencing hearing for the four
cases, Mr. Melius admitted in the 2014, 2016, and 2017 cases to violating his probation by being
convicted of physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and by
admitting to consuming alcohol. (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.7, L.18 - p.9, L.21.) Mr. Melius informed
the district court that he had been approved for drug court, and recommended that the court, in
the 2018 case, consider ordering him to engage in and successfully complete drug court.
(Tr. 12/13/18, p.26, Ls.3-10.) Mr. Melius left to the district court's discretion whether he would
be sent to complete drug court immediately or after a period of retained jurisdiction, as well as
the underlying sentence and probationary period under those options. (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.26,
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Ls.10-18.) He also urged the district court to not impose a prison sentence, but if the court were
to impose a prison sentence, he recommended a unified sentence of six years, with three years
fixed. (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.28, L.23 -p.30, L.2.)
The State recommended the district court, in the 2018 case, impose a unified sentence of
fifteen years, with six years fixed. (Tr. 12/13/18, p.11, Ls.14-16.) As for the 2014, 2016, and
2017 cases, the State recommended the district court execute the sentences. (See Tr. 12/13/18,
p.11, Ls.17-18.)
In the 2018 case, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five
years fixed. (No. 46851 R., pp.235-37.) In the 2014, 2016, and 2017 cases, the district court
revoked probation and executed the underlying sentences. (No. 46820 R., pp.237-38; No. 46821
R., pp.157-58; No. 46850 R., pp.121-22.) The sentences were all to run concurrently. (E.g.,
Tr. 12/13/18, p.40, L.23.)
Mr. Melius, in each of the four cases, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence
Pursuant to I.C.R. 35.

(No. 46820 R., pp.239-40; No. 46821 R., pp.159-60; No. 46850

R., pp.123-24; No. 46851 R., pp.238-39.) In the 2018 case, he filed a letter in support of the
Rule 35 motion. (No. 46851 PSI, pp.41-45.) At the Rule 35 motion hearing for all four cases,
the district court read the letter. (See Tr. 02/15/19, p.6, Ls.20 -p.7, L.16.) Mr. Melius also made
additional comments to the district court at the hearing. (See Tr. 02/15/19, p.7, L.17 - p.10, L.9.)
Mr. Melius' counsel characterized the letter and comments as "really more an expression of his
frustration with the underlying process ... with the underlying laws, some of the processes in his
more recent case." (See Tr. 02/15/19, p.10, L.17 -p.11, L.5.)
In his letter, Mr. Melius requested that the district court reduce his sentence in the 2018
case to a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, to reduce the sentences in the 2014,
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2016, and 2017 cases to be the same as or less than the sentence in the 2018 case, and to reduce
the sentence in the 2016 case to a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (See No.
46851 PSI, pp.44-45.) At the Rule 35 motion hearing, Mr. Melius' counsel asked the district
court to consider reducing the fixed term of the sentences, even by as little as one day or one
week.

(See Tr. 02/15/19, p.11, L.13 - p.14, L.25.)

The district court denied the Rule 35

motions. (E.g., Tr. 02/15/19, p.20, Ls.3-5.)
In the 2018 case, Mr. Melius filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's
Judgment of Conviction and Order of Commitment. (No. 46851 R., pp.251-54.) In the 2014,
2016, and 2017 cases, Mr. Melius filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order
Denying Defendant's Rule 35 Motion. (No. 46820 R., pp.252-57; No. 46821 R., pp.172-75,
182-83; No. 46850 R., pp.136-39, 143-44.) The Idaho Supreme Court ordered the four appeals
consolidated. (No. 46820 R., p.265.)

9

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in the 2018 case when it allowed the State
during voir dire to require prospective jurors to take a particular view of evidence to be
adduced at trial?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in the 2018 case when it imposed a unified
sentence often years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. Melius following his conviction for
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in all four cases when it denied Mr. Melius'
Rule 35 motions for a reduction of sentence?

10

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In The 2018 Case When It Allowed The State During
Voir Dire To Require Prospective Jurors To Take A Particular View Of Evidence To Be
Adduced At Trial

A.

Introduction
Mr. Melius asserts the district court abused its discretion in the 2018 case when it allowed

the State during voir dire to require prospective jurors to take a particular view of evidence to be
adduced at trial. The district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards,
when it allowed the State to improperly frame its questions to incorporate evidence that would
later be introduced at trial. Specifically, the State impermissibly asked two prospective jurors to
take a particular view on the factual situation presented in this case-that Mr. Melius "was
behind the driver's wheel, in the driver's seat, with the engine running."

(See, e.g., Trial

Tr., p.60, Ls.18-22.)

B.

Standard Of Review
The scope of voir dire "is a matter resting in the discretion of the trial court, the exercise

of which will not be reversed except in case of abuse." State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 819
(1967). When an appellate court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,
863 (2018).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards,
When It Allowed The State To Improperly Frame Its Questions To Incorporate Evidence
That Would Later Be Introduced At Trial
The district court allowed the State to improperly frame its questions to incorporate

evidence that would later be introduced at trial. The State asked two prospective jurors to take a
particular view on the factual situation presented here.

Thus, the district court did not act

consistently with the applicable legal standards.
The accused in criminal cases has a constitutional and statutory right to trial before an
impartial jury. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI & XIV; Idaho Const. art. I,§§ 7 & 13; LC.§§ 191902, 19-2019 & 19-2020. Voir dire examination, through which prospective jurors with actual
or implied bias may be identified and excused, protects the right to a fair and impartial jury. See
I.C.R. 24.
The voir dire examination of prospective jurors "is under the supervision of the court and
subject to such limitations as the court may order." I.C.R. 24(b). "The court must disallow any
question asked by an attorney that is not directly relevant to the qualifications of the juror, or is
not reasonably calculated to discover the possible existence of a ground for challenge, or has
been previously answered." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "great latitude is allowed" in the examination of
prospective jurors to determine whether there is sufficient ground to challenge them for statutory
cause, or whether it is expedient to challenge them peremptorily. McKeehan, 91 Idaho at 819.
However, this latitude is not unlimited. For example, in McKeehan, the Court affirmed the
district court's discretionary decision in an aggravated battery case to limit voir dire examination
into a prospective juror's biases or moral compunctions about physical violence, where

12

"counsel's question m respect of this matter was improperly framed in that it tended to
incorporate evidence which would later be introduced at trial." Id. at 819-20.
The Idaho Supreme Court later explained in a civil case that McKeehan "is consistent
with State v. Miller, [60 Idaho 79, 88 P.2d 526 (1939)], which held that the trial judge committed
reversible error in sustaining an objection to a question regarding prejudice against the use of
intoxicating liquors when the issue concerned driving while intoxicated." Mattson v. Bryan, 92
Idaho 587, 590 (1968). 3 The Mattson Court held, "The rule emerges from those cases, that
although interrogations on voir dire cannot require prospective jurors to take a particular view of
evidence to be adduced at trial, the inquires may ascertain whether the fact of the accusation of a
particular offense elicits any prejudice on their part." Id.
Before McKeehan, in State v. Hoagland, 39 Idaho 405, 228 P. 314 (1924), the Idaho
Supreme Court held, "The exclusion of questions, upon objection, which call for the venireman's
answer as to what he would do under a certain hypothetical state of the evidence, and asking if
he will be guided by the instructions, do not constitute error." Id. at _ , 228 P. at 318. In a case
discussing McKeehan and Hoagland, the Idaho Court of Appeals also noted that "other
authorities hold that hypothetical questions which have correct reference to the law of the case,
and which do not call for a prejudgement of the case or of any supposed case on the facts, may
be propounded in the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310,
312-13 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing McKeehan, 91 Idaho at 820; Hoagland, 39 Idaho 405,228 P. 314;
50 C.J.S. Juries§ 275 at 1042 n.15 (1947)).
Here, the district court allowed the State during voir dire to improperly frame its
questions to incorporate evidence that would later be introduced at trial. The prosecutor told the
3

The Mattson Court observed that, in the area of voir dire, "no distinction is to be drawn on a
criminal-civil basis." 92 Idaho at 590 (citing LC.§ 19-1905).
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prospective jurors that the alleged offense "here is that [Mr. Melius] was behind the driver's
wheel, in the driver's seat, with the engine running.

There's no allegation of driving."

(Tr. 11/07/18, p.60, Ls.18-22.) The prosecutor then asked if anyone had "a problem" with that
kind of charge. (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.60, L.23 - p.61, L.2.) Thus, the prosecutor, even before
questioning individual prospective jurors on the factual situation presented here, called for the
prejudgment of the instant case on its facts. See Camarillo, 106 Idaho at 312-13.
The first prospective juror the prosecutor specifically asked to take a particular view of
evidence to be adduced at trial stated that the law was "a little bit too harsh," if the person
charged knew they had too much to drink and turned on the car to stay warm. (See Tr. 11/07/18,
p.61, L.3 - p.63, L.4.)

After the first prospective juror indicated he could follow jury

instructions and the law despite his personal beliefs, the prosecutor directed him back to the facts
of this case, by asking, "So what about the situation here that we were talking about? Can you
set aside your personal conviction about physical control and being under the influence?" (See
Tr. 11/07/18, p.64, L.25 - p.66, L.3.)

Thus, the prosecutor improperly required this first

prospective juror "to take a particular view of evidence to be adduced at trial." See Mattson, 92
Idaho at 590.
The prosecutor also improperly required another prospective juror to take a particular
view of the evidence here. When the prosecutor asked what he thought, this second prospective
juror discussed the facts of the case, including that the incident took place in April when "it
could be cold." (See Tr. 11/07/18, p.69, Ls.16-25.) The second prospective juror also indicated
he might not be able to set aside his personal convictions without hearing further details. (See
Tr. 11/07/18, p.70, Ls.1-22.) Defense counsel asked the second prospective juror why he wanted
more facts, and he replied that more facts could cause him to change his opinion.
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(See

Tr. 11/07/18, p. 71, Ls.2-7.) Defense counsel then asked whether he was trying to answer the
prosecutor's "questions in terms of whether you would convict or not convict, aren't you?"
(Tr. 11/07/18, p.71, Ls.17-21.)

The second prospective juror answered:

"With the limited

knowledge I have, yes. I mean, he's basically telling me I have to make a yes or no answer on
whether I can set that aside at this point in time." (Tr. 11/07/18, p.71, Ls.22-25.) The prosecutor
thereby also improperly required the second prospective juror to take a particular view of the
evidence to be adduced at trial. See Mattson, 92 Idaho at 590.
Thus, the district court allowed the State during voir dire to improperly frame its
questions to incorporate evidence that would later be introduced at trial. See McKeehan, 91
Idaho at 819. By asking the prospective jurors if they could set aside their personal beliefs in
light of the facts that Mr. Melius was behind the driver's wheel, in the driver's seat, with the
vehicle running, the prosecutor's questions on the specific factual situation presented here called
for a prejudgement of the case on the facts. See Camarillo, 106 Idaho at 312-13. However,
questions "on voir dire cannot require prospective jurors to take a particular view of evidence to
be adduced at trial." See Mattson, 92 Idaho at 590.
By allowing the State to improperly frame its questions to incorporate evidence that
would later be introduced at trial, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State during
voir dire to require prospective jurors to take a particular view of evidence to be adduced at trial.

D.

The State Will Not Be Able To Meet Its Burden Of Proving That The District Court's
Abuse Of Discretion Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State will not be able to meet its burden of proving that the district court's abuse of

discretion here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Where alleged error is followed by a
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contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the
burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). "To hold an error as harmless, an appellate court
must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that
such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507
(1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
Here, the State will simply be unable to meet its burden of proving that the district court's
abuse of discretion, in allowing the State during voir dire to require prospective jurors to take a
particular view of evidence to be adduced at trial, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, Mr. Melius' judgment of conviction in the 2018 case should be vacated, and the case
should be remanded to the district court for a new trial.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In the 2018 Case When It Imposed A Unified Sentence
Of Ten Years, With Five Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Melius Following His Conviction For Physical
Control Of A Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence Of Alcohol
In the alternative, Mr. Melius asserts the district court abused its discretion in the 2018
case when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, upon him following
his conviction for physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The
district court should have instead followed Mr. Melius' recommendations by ordering him to
engage in and successfully complete drug court, either immediately while on probation or after a
period ofretainedjurisdiction. (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.26, Ls.3-18.) Alternatively, the district court
should have imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three years fixed. (See Tr. 12/13/18,
p.28, L.23 - p.30, L.2.)

16

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving "due regard
to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Melius does not assert that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in
order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Melius must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria
or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the

individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing.

Id.

An appellate court, "[w ]hen reviewing the length of a

sentence ... consider[s] the defendant's entire sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726
(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement." Id.
Mr. Melius asserts the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive considering any
view of the facts, because the district court did not adequately consider mitigating factors.
Specifically, the district court did not adequately consider that, because the 2018 case involved
Mr. Melius deciding to sleep in his truck after getting drunk, it was not a typical case of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence.

As defense counsel asserted at the

sentencing hearing, society's concern in DUI cases is "the driving, the person making the wrong
choice to drive after they've been drinking, because it's the choice that surely puts other member

17

of society at risk." (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.22, L.25 - p.23, L.4.) However, the 2018 case, as well
as Mr. Melius' last few convictions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence,
instead involved Mr. Melius "getting drunk and sitting in his car with the engine running." (See
Tr. 12/13/18, p.23, Ls.9-10.) According to Mr. Melius' counsel, Mr. Melius was "making a
conscious choice to not drive, to not put himself and other members of the public at risk when he
knows he shouldn't be driving. I believe that's exactly what he told the officer that night. He
chose to sleep it of£" (Tr. 12/13/18, p.23, L.22 - p.24, L. 1.) Thus, defense counsel asserted that
there was a relative lack of risk to the community here as opposed to a traditional DUI case,
because the "dangerous choice to drive while impaired" was absent. (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.24,
Ls.18-25.)
The district court also did not give adequate consideration to Mr. Melius' desire to try
drug court as a more effective way to deal with his substance abuse problems. Defense counsel
informed the district court that Mr. Melius' activities with friends and family, such as hunting,
golfmg, and fishing, involved some amount of social drinking. (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.16, L.17 p.17, L.6.) Over the last decade, Mr. Melius had participated in treatment programs, including
outpatient treatment, AA, the Good Samaritan program, and a rider. (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.17,
Ls.19-24.) Mr. Melius had told his counsel that the primary factor in his repeated convictions
was not alcohol addiction, but isolation.

(See Tr. 12/13/18, p.19, Ls.9-14.)

The activities

Mr. Melius enjoyed, as well as family functions, continued to involve social drinking.

(See

Tr. 12/13/18, p.19, L.22 - p.20, L.3.) However, Mr. Melius knew he could not be around social
drinking if he hoped to maintain his sobriety, and had taken the lesson from his rider that "you
need to get away from people that drink, you can't be around, it because it will cause you to
drink." (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.20, Ls.3-8.)
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As Mr. Melius' counsel put it, Mr. Melius had tried to stay away from people that drink,
"But what that's led him to is just the isolation. Rand doesn't go out and hunt and golf or fish
with friends because he knows they would be drinking." (Tr. 12/13/18, p.20, Ls.9-14.) Further,
Mr. Melius had "stopped going to family functions because he knew there would drinking there,
and eventually, he tells me that, you know, it got to the point where his family no longer even
invites him to family functions because they know he shouldn't be around it, and they want to
drink .... " (Tr. 12/13/18, p.20, Ls.14-21.) In short, "Mr. Melius has kind of just for the last
five years been trying to just wall himself off from the world and isolate himself" (Tr. 12/13/18,
p.20, Ls.22-25.) Mr. Melius had indicated to his counsel that isolation, "more than anything ...
has led him to make the extremely wrong choice to go out and drink on occasions like this."
(See Tr. 12/13/18, p.20, L.25 - p.21, L.3.) In the 2018 case, Mr. Melius had indicated that "he

had a long period of sobriety there, he got to the point where he just couldn't take the isolation
anymore, and he chose to go out to a bar and drink and socialize with the other patrons there."
(See Tr. 12/13/18, p.21, Ls.3-8.)

Mr. Melius also told defense counsel "that he thinks that what he needs is to learn to live
a social life without drinking . . . . So he says he needs relationships, he needs activities he can
do with sober friends, with sober support." (Tr. 12/13/18, p.21, Ls.14-24.) Mr. Melius had been
accepted into drug court. (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.22, Ls.8-11; No. 46851 PSI, p.39.) He had told
his counsel that drug court "appears to be the type of structure, treatment that would be more
geared towards him, because, again, it is a lot more one-on-one meetings, it is a lot more
socializing with the other participants, as well as the probation officer there." (Tr. 12/13/18,
p.22, Ls.11-17.) Additionally, Mr. Melius had never tried drug court before. (See Tr. 12/13/18,
p.26, Ls.4-10.)
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Defense counsel suggested that drug court, as a new option, could work for Mr. Melius
where previous treatment programs had not.

(See Tr. 12/13/18, p.26, L.21 - p.27, L.19.)

Moreover, as for Mr. Melius' isolation, counsel asserted the social support provided in drug
court, "seeing the judge, seeing everyone, and seeing other people in the same position as him
and openly befriending them, engaging in social activities with them is the sort of thing that
would eliminate that isolation, which has been his problem thus far." (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.27,
L.20 - p.28, L.8.) Mr. Melius' counsel also thought the drug court probation officer "is by far
and away the best probation officer that this county has," and "would be a huge resource for
Rand should he get into Drug Court." (See Tr. 12/13/18, p.28, Ls.9-16.)
Addressing the district court, Mr. Melius stated: "I've really tried to cut off my previous
associations with friends that drank, and that also includes places that I used to go to hang out,
activities I used to enjoy. So I have become somewhat of a recluse ... and I think that that's
kind of been a pattern for me." (Tr. 12/13/18, p.31, L.22 - p.32, L.2.) He continued: "When I
feel alone or get lonely, that's a release for me. And, obviously, I need to find a different way to
deal with that. I do believe that Drug Court is an option for me at this time." (Tr. 12/13/18,
p.32, Ls.2-6.)
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating factors, the
sentence imposed by the district court is excessive considering any view of the facts. Thus, the
district court abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Melius' sentence in the 2018 case. The
district court should have instead followed Mr. Melius' recommendations by ordering him to
engage in and successfully complete drug court, either immediately while on probation or after a
period of retained jurisdiction. Alternatively, the district court should have imposed a unified
sentence of six years, with three years fixed.
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III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In All Four Cases When It Denied Mr. Melius' Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motions For A Reduction Of Sentence
Mr. Melius asserts that the district court abused its discretion in all four cases when it
denied his Rule 35 motions for a reduction of sentence, in view of the new and/or additional
information presented in support of the motions. "A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence
under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a
plea for leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe."
State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). "The denial of a motion
for modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its
discretion." Id. "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same
as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id.

"If the

sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive
in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction." Id.
Mr. Melius asserts his sentences are excessive in view of the new and/or additional
information presented in support of the Rule 35 motions.

While Mr. Melius expressed his

frustration with the DUI laws and trial process in his letter to the district court and at the Rule 35
hearing, he also included some new and/or additional information. For example, as Mr. Melius
asserted in his letter to the district court, he scored a zero on his initial risk and needs assessment
at the prison, on a scale of one to fifty, with one point subtracted for his age. (See No. 46851
PSI, p.44.) The letter also stated that Mr. Melius was "being approved for off compound work in
the community." (No. 46851 PSI, p.44.) During the Rule 35 hearing, Mr. Melius' counsel told
the district court, "he's already been assessed by IDOC at the lowest possible level an inmate can
be assessed at." (Tr. 02/15/19, p.14, Ls.5-7.) Defense counsel fully expected Mr. Melius "to be
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a model prisoner, to not have any problems, and to earn his way on to parole." (Tr. 02/15/19,
p.14, Ls.8-9.)
Mr. Melius asserts his sentences are excessive in view of the above new and/or additional
information presented in support of the Rule 35 motions. Thus, the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motions.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Melius respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
judgment of conviction in the 2018 case, and remand the case to the district court for a new
trial. In the alternative, Mr. Melius respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence in
the 2018 case as it deems appropriate. With regard to his Rule 35 motions in all four cases,
Mr. Melius respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 24 th day of October, 2019.
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